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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Interest in how people make judgments
about the likelihood of future
events has sparked
decade.
tional

a

lively area of theory and research
over the past

The psychology of prediction has burgeoned
across the tradi-

psychological interest areas.

The intriguing and compelling work

of Kahneman and Tversky (1972) has motivated

a

number of studies that

demonstrate how subjects utilize important information
inappropriately
and are less than accurate in making predictions
when compared with

normative models.

Since this original work, several researchers (Lyon

and Slovic, 1976, Bar-Hillel, 1977, Ajzen,
1977) have manipulated aspects

of the information provided subjects during performance
of

a

prediction

task in an attempt to determine when and under what conditions
certain
types of information are used or ignored.

The present research is concerned with these questions: what infor-

mation do people use and why do they use it when making
The focus of the paper is on the prediction task as

a

a

prediction?

process.

Instead

of contending that one type of information will be used and another
type will not, this paper suggests that information is used if it satisfies

a

logical

causal process established by an individual when faced

with the task of making

a

lated piece of information

prediction.
is

The nature or content of an iso-

less critical

than how that information

fits into the process.
In order to understand this approach,

sent

a

it is appropriate to pre-

brief overview of existing prediction research.

Much of this

research has been concerned with the use and nonuse of base-rates and

2

with the impact of these base base-rates
on predictions.
special emphasis is placed upon that type
of research.

summary of some attribution literature

is

way to explore the prediction process.

summary will provide

a

Consequently,
Then

selected

a

presented, as it may offer

a

Conclusions drawn from this

framework upon which the present research

is

based.

Prediction

At present

a

majority of the empirical work on prediction has

been primarily concerned with

a

comparison of the outcomes predicted

by normative models and the results actually obtained when
individuals

are asked to make predictions about the future occurance of an event.

Such work has not consistently addressed the way people evaluate the

information that
evence to

a

is

available to them or how they determine its rel-

given population.

Typical of this approach, and of particular interest to the

present research, is the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973,

Tversky and Kahneman, 1974).

They suggest that three general types of

information are relevant to predictions:
(base-rates;

2)

1)

prior background information

specific evidence concerning individual causes;

expected accuracy of the prediction.

3)

From their research, they suggest

that people intuitively ignore factors and violate statistical

rules

in systematic ways.

To

They label these violations "heuristics."

explain, one heuristic is what they term representativeness.

were presented with

a

Subjects

series of short personality sketches of people

4

on base-rates revised their earlier
position that suggested people use
a

"representativeness heuristic", and concurred
with the Ajzen position.
They too developed the thesis that
subjects will use base-rates when
they are perceived as causal and not
ignore base-rates in all cases.

Base-rates

.

The Ajzen study (1977) explored base-rate
use by varying the causal

nature of the content.
a

He asked subjects to judge the likelihood
that

given student has passed

a

final

exam.

given base-rates that provided causal
given non-causal base-rates.
of the students in

a

Half of the subjects were

information, the other half were

The causal base-rates reported that 75%

given course passed (failed) an exam.

ferred that this sort of base-rate carried

a

causal

Ajzen in-

component: infor-

mation concerning the ease or difficulty of the exam.

The non-causal

base-rate reported that an educational psychologist interested in

scholastic achievement interviewed
taken

a

a

large number of students who had

course and since he was primarily interested in reactions to

success (failure), he selected mostly students who had passed (failed).
This format of the base-rate was presented as carrying no causal com-

ponent; no conclusions about the ease or difficulty of the exam could
be drawn.

Ajzen found that the "causal base-rate" was used by subjects

when making their predictions, whereas, the "non-causal base-rate"
was not used.

From these findings he concluded that use of

a

base-

rate is affected by whether or not it is causal in nature, and labled
this tendency as the "causality heuristic."

Nisbett and Borgida (1975) conducted

a

study that may raise some

problems for Ajzen's causality heuristic.

percentage results from

a

previous experiment on helping behavior
and

asked them to predict how likely
the individual

a

particular subject was to have helped

in distress. Their findings

not use the base-rates

They gave subjects the

(the actual

indicate that subjects did

results or numbers of people who

helped) when making their predictions.

The nature of the base-rate'

in this study is similar in fashion to the
causal

provided his subjects.

The causal

base-rate Ajzen

link established by the data on

helping behavior parallels the inferred ease of an exam and/or
the
brightness of the students from the Ajzen study, yet the base-rate
was not used.

It appears

that the general statement that subjects will

use base-rates if they are perceived as causal may not hold true in
all

situations.

At the vary least, review of the Nisbett and Borgida

study in this light sheds some doubt on the general i zabi

1 i

ty of the

"causality heuristic."

Tversky and Kahneman (1977) attempt to resolve the apparent conflict between these two studies.

They suggest that "base-rate data

which describe the difficulty or attractiveness of an action are used
when they complete

a

schema that is not fully specified, but not when

they conflict with an existing schema" (p. 33).

This would seem to

imply that conditions in the Ajzen study present schema which are not

"fully specified;" the causal base-rate completes this schema and is
used, but the non-causal base-rates either conflicts with or does not

fully round out the schema and is not used.

explanation, which

is

This form of post hoc

difficult to fully comprehend, sheds little light

upon the predictable use of base-rates.

Other research has addressed the issue of
conditions under which
base-rates are used or ignored.

Lyon and Slovic (1976) manipulated

particular aspects of the base-rate information
given subjects.

They

varied the order of presentation of base-rates
and case descriptions

(individuating information), the base-rate precentages
as well as the
stated validity of the base-rates, and they still
found base-rates to
be under utilized or ignored.

Though the findings were pervasive,

they were unable to offer any general
Bar-Hi

11 el

i

zabl e reason for this finding.

(1977) has attempted to codify the plethora of explana-

tions and interpretations of the base-rate phenomena and
has concluded

that "people order items according to their perceived relevance
to the

required judgment.

More relevant items dominate less relevant ones.

Items are combined only if they are perceived as equally relevant.

The base-rate fallacy [underuse of base-rates] is

a

direct result of

these base-rates having been (subjectively) less relevant than the in-

dicators" (p. 9).

Bar-Hi 1 lei did not directly measure "relevance," but

rather intuitively identified items as "more or less relevant."

She

designed over 40 situations and presented them to 1500 students in

order to test her hypothesis.
the general izabi

1 i

Her results clearly demonstrate both

ty of the base-rate fallacy, as well

support of exceptions to it.
to make base-rate relevant,

Under conditions that she "designed"
she found that subjects did use base-

rate informations in making predictions.

Her subjects were given in-

formation about the number of blue vs. green cabs in
of an eyewitness report concerning the color of

accident.

as considerable

a

a

city and

a

case

cab involved in an

The eyewitness was characterized as being able to identify

7

the color of the cab correctly "about
80% of the time, but confusing
it with the color of the other cab
about 20% of the time"

(p.l).

Given such individuating information, subjects
ignored the base-rate

(percentage of green vs. blue cabs) and based their
judgments solely
upon the data from the eyewitness.

However, when the base-rate infor-

mation concerning cabs was made relevant,

a

Relevance was introduced by giving subjects

different pattern emerged.
a

base-rate that 85% of

the cab accidents in the city involve green cabs and
15% involve blue

cabs, followed by the eyewitness report.

In this

case both individu-

ating information and base-rate were used in making
Hi

1

a

judgment.

Bar-

concluded that such results support the relevance hypothesis,

lei

even though no direct relevance measure was taken for subjects and

alternate explanations may exist.
The present state of affairs regarding use or non-use of baserates is in greater flux than after the initial

posed people predict by using "heuristics."

experiments that pro-

Fewer consistencies have

been discovered and the impact of content, intuitive relevance or

causality and post hoc explanations each offers some form of interpretation

.

Prediction and attribution work have been, for the most part pursued from separate and distinct theoretical frameworks and research
paradigms.

Fischoff (1976) has highlighted these differences.

He

suggested that attribution research finds people to be effective processors of information who organize their world in

a

systematic way

with few biases; whereas, judgment research reveals people to be quite
inept information processors.

It is appropriate to reflect upon the

8

Impact these different fundamental conceptual
biases may have on the

research that

is

these empirical

designed and the interpretations that are favored
by
traditions.

But the focus of the present paper is on

the insights that may be generated when attribution
theory and research
are brought to bear upon the process of predicting.

Because of the

similarities between base-rates and consensus information,
particular
attention will be paid to attribution literature that pertains
to the
use of consensus data.

Attribution

.

Attribution
world.

In

is

a

process whereby an individual

"explains"

hi';

an attempt to impose order and meaning on the maze of events

daily encountered, people seem to find comfort in believing that things
do not just randomly happen; they happen "because..." Heider (1958)

was concerned with the phenomenological

themselves and other people.

picture all people have of

He suggested that people, seeking to

establish cognitive consistency, explain responses and situations by
integrating certain cues and inferring more stable factors from them,
i.e., they make attributions.

tendency for

a

person to see others as having caused their actions,

and in particular, in whether

of internal or external

internal

vs.

a

person's behavior was seen as

a

result

forces.

Kelley (1967) detailed
attribution.

Heider was interested in the common

a

more precise and general izable model of

He pointed to three kinds of information which determine

external attribution.

The first, distinctiveness infor-

mation, refers to whether the person being considered makes the same
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kind of response to many different kinds
of entities or whether the

response
is

is

made only to this particular class of entities.

consensus information which refers to whether
other persons would

be likely to make the same response in the
same situation.
is

The second

The third

modality/time information from which one infers
consistency, i.e.,

whether or not
stimulus

is

a

particular response occurs whenever

present.

a

particular

Generally these factors are considered in com-

bination, as in the example:
John likes very few movies, but does like a particular movie (high distinctiveness); everyone
else likes this particular movie (high consensus)
and John's liking for the movie does not depend
on whether he sees it at home or in the theater
(high consistency).
Under these conditions, one
can be relatively certain that John's liking for
a particular movie is a function of the movie,
rather than of John.
The attribution would be
an external one.
(Kelley, 1967)

McArthur (1972) designed an approach for testing the Kelley model.
Basically she attempted to study how attributions are facilitated by
various combinations of consensus, distinctiveness and consistency

information.

Her findings suggest that consistency and distinctive-

ness are more informative than consensus information.

This lack of

impact of consensus information on attribution has generated

a

consid-

erable body of work in an attempt to discover when and under what
conditions consensus information might be used.

[See, for example,

Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1976), Hansen and Donoghue (1977)]
A short summary of these studies may demonstrate the status of

understanding which exists concerning the use of consensus information,
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1976) failed to find an impact
of consensus information on self-attribution.

They asked subjects to
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eat crackers and drink

a

sweetened liquid and then to compare
the

amounts they consumed with other subjects.

The subjects were then

asked to explain why they ate and drank
the amounts they did.
findings indicated no impact of consensus
information.

Their

The subjects

did not use the information on the amounts
consumed by others when

explaining their own behavior.

Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed

argue that one reason for this may be that
consensus information

is

"abstract, pallid and remote" and that perceivers tend
to rely on per-

ceptually vivid data for making an inference

(p. 127).

In

this

it would be expected that subjects would ignore
the consensus

mation on personal attributions.
own behavior in

compelling.

a

light
infor-

They suggest that knowledge of one's

given situation renders sample-based consensus less

Additional explanations exist to account for the failure

of subjects to use consensus information.

Wells and Harvey (1977) and

Hansen and Donoghue (1977) demonstrated that subjects were less willing
to use consensus when the representativeness of the sample was in ques-

tion.

When the randomness of the information was assured, (Wells and

Harvey, 1977) subjects were more likely to utilize the data.
The original Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed study (1976) was

predominantly concerned with subjects' attributions for their own behavior.

Hansen and Stoner (1978) in

a

replication of this study also

asked subjects to explain the behavior of other persons.

They were

asked to make causal attributions about the impact of the crackers'
taste on other subjects' thirst.

The results indicated

a

failure of

the consensus information to have an impact on the observers' judge-

ments of the taste of the crackers.

However, when asked to determine

n
how thirsty the subjects were, the
consensus information did have
great deal of influence.

a

Hansen and Stoner conducted additional
exper-

iments designed to explore the factors
influencing these different

patterns of results.

Generally, their findings indicated that
whether

explaining one's own behavior or anothers,
people are quite willing
to infer dispositions discrepant from
that of the consensus.

Observers

were more likely than actors to infer stimulas
attributes from consensus
information and there was

a

than actors when making

causal

a

greater impact of consensus on observers
attribution.

However, even observers

did not use consensus information in all cases.

that this is

a

Hansen and Stone suggest

result of their inability to infer

a

clear and logical

relationship between consensus and the attribution.
a

Kassin (1979) in

recent literature review points out that existing evidence has dem-

onstrated that consensus has

a

substantially larger effect on the

attribution of occurrances than on actions.
Hansen and Lowe (1976) suggest that the underuse of consensus

information may be
a

a

result of an individual's ability to generate

"consensus" by virtue of knowing or surmising what his or her own

behavior might have been in

a

given situation.

Feldman, Higgins,

Karlovac, and Ruble (1976) suggest that the use of consensus information
may be related to the subjects receiving information about the target
person.

With information from their own personal experience with the

stimulas, or enough information to take the role of the target person,

consensus has no impact.

However, without such information consensus

may be utilized by subjects when making an inference.
This brief review of attribution literature indicates the complexity
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of findings concerning the use of
consensus information.

In

some con-

ditions studies demonstrate that subjects
do use consensus information,
but in others they seem to ignore it.

Although the various authors

have offered explanations as to why
subjects do or do not utilize

consensus information, none has outlined

a

comprehensive framework

that would parsimoniously account for the
existing data, let alone

-

allow for the generation of predictions about
the conditions for use
of consensus data.
The close relationship of the attribution task and
the prediction

task, and the similarities and differences between
base-rates and con-

sensus information, have not escaped the scrutiny of
several authors.

Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed (1976) state "an
attribution, moreover, is more complicated and indirect inference than
(p. 124).

"When faced with the task of making

are asked to produce

ences.

a

a

prediction"

prediction, subjects

a

rather direct and uncomplicated chain of infer-

If the majority of members of the population belong to

ticular category, the odds are the target does also"
attribution,

a

still

(p. 124).

more elaborate chain of inferences

"If the majority of the population behave in

a

is

a

par-

In

requested.

particular way, then the

situation must exert strong pressure toward that behavior and, therefore, it is unparsimonious to involve personal

for the behavior that is modal" (p. 124).

i

diosyncracies to account

Ajzen (1977) points out an

important difference between the effect of the base-rates on prediction
and consensus information in attributions.

He suggests that in the

case of predictions, base-rates directly affect the event's (objective)

probability, since they provide actual facts about the relative frequency

,

.
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of the event to be predicted.
relative frequency and

However, the link between an event's

potential underlying disposition is
merely

a

inferential

However, such explicit distinctions no
longer seem so clear.
Recently, attribution researchers, troubled
with the lack of impact

consensus information seems to have on
attributions, have attempted
to understand the finding by citing the
parallel

base-rate data found in prediction research.

to

the underuse of

Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall

and Reed (1976) have made explicit the similarity
between consensus in-

formation and base-rate information.

base-rate information.

It is

"Consensus information is precisely

base-rate information about behavior

responses rather than category membership" (p. 124).
Ross (1977) has suggested an inherent connection exists between

the often distinct areas of attribution and prediction, that they
are

implicitly related and the latter is

a

natural extension of the former.

"Explanations for and inference from an event are obviously and inti-

mately related and together they form an important basis for speculation
about unknown and future events" (Ross, 1977,

p.

1975).

How can the

attribution literature help explore the process of prediction making?
An important first consideration is "why does someone, outside of the

experimental setting, attempt to explain behavior or events, i.e.,
make attributions?"

It seems

logical

that one dominant response might

be "to understand why something happened in order to predict what may

happen in the future."

The example given earlier for attribution

dealt with John attending

a

movie.

Someone might be interested in

14

determining the reasons John likes

a

particular movie because of

a

desire to decide whether or not it's worth spending
money to go oneself
--

to make a prediction about movie quality.

The present study attempts to consider the two
processes-attri-

bution and prediction— as parts of

connection between them.

a

whole and suggests an inherent

Specifically, the contention

that when

is

faced with the task of predicting an event or behavior, one
formulates
a

sort of hypothesis that the specific event or behavior has
occurred

and then seeks confirmation.

sidered as

"given."

a

"John attended

a

movie.

The prediction question itself is con-

"How likely is John to attend

movie?" becomes

What factors suggest this to be true?"; "Why

might that be?"; or, "What may have caused this?"
akin to that of attribution.
the potential

a

The task

is

It is likely that the individual

causes of what might induce someone to see

a

now

seeks

movie (eg.:

moviebuff, excellent reviews for the movie, nothing else to do in

particular town, etc.) and then attempts

to

a

establish which items of

information about John in this situation corresponds to these potential
causes.

It

is

these items which are used, the others ignored when

making the actual

likelihood judgment.

In

brief summary, an individual

may first consider the prediction question as

a

statement to be verified.

The task becomes one of attribution, explaining the factors which may

have caused the event to occur.

Information which confirms this

"hypothesis" is utilized, otherwise it

There

is

a

ignored.

some evidence that people do exactly this type of

thesis confirming in other situations.

presented

is

hypo-

Snyder (1979) has explored and

theory concerning the way individuals hold onto preset

notions about people.

His finding suggest that people engage in

behaviors that will confirm hypotheses already held.

In a series of

investigations, his subjects preferentially solicited
behavioral

evidence that tended to confirm their hypothesis by treating
their
targets as if they were the type of person they were
hypothesized to
be.

They planned to search preferentially for behavior evidence
that

would confirm their hypothesis."

(p. 41).

His findings concerning

hypothesis-testing strategies appear to be pervasive.

It seemed to

matter not at all to participants where their hypothesis originated,
or how likely it was that their hypothesis would prove accurate or

inaccurate (implicit base-rate) or whether or not the hypothesis ex-

plicitly defined the confirming or disconfi rming attributes.
Snyder suggests that it may be this mechanism which helps so many
beliefs remain stubbornly resistant to change.

doubt about the accuracy of

a

Even when sufficient

belief leads one to test it, one never-

theless may be likely to attend to only that evidence which would be

needed to confirm

a

belief.

It is

reasonable to consider these findings

in order to understand the proposed process of hypothesis testing that

one implicitly engages in when making

Research

question

a

prediction.

.

This paper suggests that people, when faced with the task of pre-

dicting, treat the prediction question as if it were an hypothesis
that requires confirmation.

In order to elicit those factors which

confirm the hypothesis, the task implicitly becomes one of attribution,

or explaining what may have caused that
particular event or behavior.
In such a process

it is

identification of the factors which establish

possible reasons for the event or situation occurring
that letermines

which information is to be used.
It is possible that one way to treat this

subjects with base-rates for use as potential

notion is to provide
reasons.

Base-rates

consist of knowledge about the relative frequency of an event in

relevant population.

Base-rates which would provide potential

for an outcome would be "causal" in nature, i.e., present

connection between the outcome and antecedents.
not serve as potential

a

a

reasons

logical

Base-rates which would

reasons, would be non-causal or statistical and

offer no logical causal link.

The Ajzen (1977) -paradigm suggests

manner in which this information distinction may be established.
provided
exam.

a

a

Two years ago,

course at Yale University.

passed (failed) the exam."

(p. 308).

a

final

base-rate information:

in a course at Yale University.
in

The non-causal base-rate on the

Two years ago,

to success

a

final

"non-

exam was given

An educational psychologist interested

scholastic achievement interviewed

had taken the course.

exam was

About 75% of the students

other hand implied no such causal information about the exam,
causal

He

causal base-rate that inferred ease or difficulty of an

"Causal base-rate information:

given in

a

a

large number of students who

Since he was primarily concerned with reactions

(failure), he selected mostly students who had passed

(failed) the exam.

Specifically about 75% of the students in his

sample had passed (failed) the exam."

(p. 308)

The other type of information to provide to subjects as possible
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reasons for particular outcomes would
be case histories or individu-

ating information.

This would follow the Kahneman and
Tversky (1972)

design and specifically provides data
regarding the individual or

event in question.

As opposed to information

this sort of information is singular.

about population ratios,

For the pupose of the present

study, both types of information, causal
and non-causal base-rates
and individuating information, will be used.

One study will

look at

the possible combinations of base-rates
alone and their impact on

predictions.

In this

fashion it is possible to make explicit predic-

tions about which base-rates will be used, i.e., in
all

cases causal

base-rates will be used when available, and only in their
absence will
the non-causal

rates will

base-rates be used.

The causal nature of the base-

provide compelling explanations for an event or behavior.

A second study will

then consider how the use of causal and non-

causal base-rates is mediated by individuating information that is or
is

not hypothesis confirming.

will

be presented,

1)

Three types of individuating information

confirming,

2)

disconfi rming, and

3)

Hypothesis confirming data will provide information which

vague.
is

consistent

with and supportive of the hypothesis one naturally establishes from
the prediction question.

likely

is

John to attend

mation: John is

a

Example:
a

movie?).

John attended

a

movie (from

-

How

Confirming individuating infor-

movie-buff and likes to go out often.

Disconfi rming

data provides information that is in opposition to the hypothesis

established by the prediction question.

Example:

attend movies and hasn't seen one in years."

"John hates to

This sort of information

would not tend to support the established hypothesis.

Vague information

provides little to support or refute the
hypothesis.
is

an English major and attends the state
university".

study will combine either

a

causal

Example:

"John

The second

or non-causal base-rate with one

of three types of individuating information,
both items will be used
in generating the prediction.

However, with non-confirming individu-

ating information, even the causal base-rate
will be ignored and subjects will

history.

rely solely upon the diagnosticity of the
individual

When information, that singular information will
provide

the basis for the prediction and the base-rate will
be ignored.
in

case

Only

the conditions when no individuating information is provided
will

subjects use the non-causal base-rates.

CHAPTER
STUDY

II

I

Method

Subjects

.

The subjects were 40 American undergraduate students
of both sexes in
the "Year Abroad Program" at the Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.

ticipation was entirely voluntary.

Subjects were recruited from

variety of courses and assigned at random and in equal numbers

Para

the

to

four cells of the experimental design (10 subjects per cell).

Procedure

.

The emperical core of the thesis was

a

collection of prediction problems

Each subject was instructed to read an introduction sheet (see Appen-

dix #1) which provided some information about the general health status

of college age students.

They were then given one of the four pre-

diction problems which consisted of two different base-rates concerning
male and female propensity for contracting and/or suffering from

particular illness.

Two types of base-rates were used, causal and

statistical or non-causal

Note:

a

J

The different base-rates provided were

Ajzen (1977) points out that causal and non-causal base-rates
for research purposes are based largely upon intuitive consideration. Although manipulation checks validate these opinion,
we have only limited knowledge about the factors which lead
people to attribute causal characteristics to given variables.
19
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as

follows:
Casual base-rate

#1

read,

"Records from Israeli University
Health

services indicate that upper respiratory
infections (common colds)
are the most common illnesses
among all college age students.
During
the 1978-79 academic year, 70% of
all

cases were of female students

and 30% were male students."
Causal base-rate #2 read, "Nationwide
the percentage of upper

respiratory infections that last in excess
of two weeks

is

three times

higher among male students than among female
students."
Statistical base-rate

ersity did

a

#1

read, "A nursing student at Hebrew Univ-

study on the health behavior of students.

Because she

was primarily interested in how women react
to illness, she chose to

interview mostly female students who had or were
suffering from upper

respiratory infections (common colds).

As

a

result, 70% of her sample

were women and only 30% of those interviewed were male
students suffering
from upper respiratory infections."

Statistical base-rate #2a read, "As it turned out, she was also

interested in how the length of an illness affects males and females
differently.

Consequently, she chose her subjects such that three times

more male students than female students had upper respiratory infections
that lasted in excess of two weeks."

Statistical base-rate #2b read, "At Hebrew University there are
three times more male students than female students."
As can be seen, the causal base-rates imply that female students

are more likely than male students to get ill

(70/30) but that male

students who get ill are more likely to have the illness last longer
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(3 times more likely).

cations.

The statistical base-rates offer
no such impli-

Statistical base-rates

#1

and #2a present population
ratios

that were structured by the nursing
student for her study and in no

way represents the natural state of
affairs.

The base-rates consequently

do not suggest anything about the
nature of illness in males or females.

Statistical base-rate #2b is merely

way connected to illness.

a

peculation ratio and not in any

The four conditions in this study are:

causal base-rate #1, causal base-rate
#2;

Statistical base-rate #2b;

3)

1)

causal base-rate #1,

2)

statistical base-rate #1, causal base-

rate #2; and 4) statistical base-rate
#1, statistical base-rate #2a.
For each condition, after reading the scenario,
subjects were

asked to judge the likelihood of

cular illness being male.
that

a

a

person drawn at random with

The question read,

a

parti-

"What is the probability

student selected at random from those with upper respiratory

infections lasting in excess of two weeks was
dictions were measured on

10%

20%

30%

a

a

male student?"

Pre-

scale:

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Not at
all likely

90%

100%

Absolutely
likely

Participants were allowed as much time as they wanted to complete
the question and in no case did the amount of time exceed ten minutes.

After all questional' res were completed and returned, anyone wishing to
discuss the study was invited to remain.

A number of students at each

administration session chose to remain and partake in the discussion.
The content of the stimulas materials seemed to generate

a

good deal of

.
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interest and several students hoped
the discussion could be
for seeking professional

a

forum

advice.

Normative Prediction vs. Predictions
Suggested by the Theoretical Model

The thesis evolves

a

base-rates would be used.

model

that predicts in what conditions the

Bayes

'

Rule suggests

a

proper normative

way to combine the two different pieces of
information.

In odds

from,

this rule can be written as 0 = Z x R where
0 denotes the posterior

odds in favor of

a

particular inference; and

ratio for that inference.

that

a

student with

student.

a

In

R

denotes the likelihood

this study, of interest is the probability

particular illness lasting over

Denote illness in males and females by M and

weeks is

2

F,

a

male

respectively,

and denote the duration of the illness by m.

n = p (M/m)

_
"

P(F/m)

P(m/M)
P(m/F)

P(M
PlF

"

in condition #1
75
.25

P(M/m)

=

A

"

225
175

.30
.70

T7f||

r

=

.56

Therefore, the normative prediction under condition
56%.
as

In

fact, for all

#1

would be

cases, 56% would be the normative prediction

it reflects the use of both base-rates.

However, as has been

explained previously, the theoretical model of the paper suggests that
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the predictions made by subjects
depends upon the perception of
the

base-rate as causal or statistical.
For all conditions, it has been
hypothesized that causal baserates be employed for making a prediction.
4 will

That is, only in condition

the statistical base-rates be used, and
in conditions

3 the causal

1

,

2

and

base-rates will be used exclusively.

Results

Table

1

presents the results and comparisons among the
predicted

results that would be obtained by using Bayes

Clearly, the results of conditions
to the thesis'
1

predictions.

1,

1

Rule.

and 4 correspond directly

2

Both causal base-rates are used in condition

and, in fact, the results correspond almost exactly with

combination of the information.

a

Baysian

As was predicted for condition 4, both

statistical base-rates were used as no cuasal base-rate was offered.
Once again the results fairly duplicate the answers arrived at through
Bayes' Rule.

The distribution of the results (see graph

1)

demonstrates

how consistent these responses are.

Conditions

2

and 3 provided one causal

base-rate and one statistical

base-rate.

The premise of this paper predicted use of only the causal

base-rate.

The findings of .32 for condition

this.

Obviously the statistical

30/70 ratio considered.
as their prediction.

information is ignored and only the

In fact, all

This is

a

clearly demonstrates

2

but

2

of the respondents gave 30

predicted deviation from the results

one would obtain using Bayes' Rule.

-

Condition

3

presents

a

deviation

from the correspondence between the predictions laid out in the paper
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and the results.

Subjects seem to attempt to combine both
base-rates

in some fashion and do not ignore
the statistical

of .49 is quite close to

a

base-rate.

The mean

simple unweighted average (.52) of the
two

numbers offered by the base-rates.

This finding is contrary to pro-

posals in the paper and different from the
finding in condition #2
in which subjects do ignore the statistical

upon the causal

base-rate and rely solely

base-rate.

Discussion

.

When subjects are given two causal or two statistical base-rates,
they are able to combine them using

a

Bayes'

Rule.

(1972)

tendency to ignore or underuse

method whose outcome parallels

Subjects do not show any of the Kahneman and Tversky
a

base-rate as long as the two

are of equivalent nature, i.e. statistical or causal.

appear to be quite competent Baysians.

They, in fact,

On the other hand, when the

base-rates are of mixed nature, i.e. one statistical and one causal,
they do not necessarily attend to both items of information.

interest to consider why it is that in condition

2

It is of

the subjects totally

ignore the statistical base-rate (as per prediction) yet for condition
3

they attempt to use both base-rates.

A critical

of the different statistical base-rates may suggest

discrepancy.

Statistical base-rate #2b presents

a

look at the content
a

reason for this

mere population

ratio and the number of male and female students is in no way specif-

ically related to the content in question (although it clearly would
affect the actual probabilities).

The hypothesis that is established

by subjects from the prediction question is not related to this

24a

population ratio.
a

On the other hand, statistical base-rate

#1

presents

relevant population so clearly that subjects find it almost impossible

to ignore.

The health/illness content in statistical base-rate

and

#1

#2a does relate to that which is to be predicted even though it does not

necessarily define
for the subjects'

a

population for consideration.

It provides

"because"

a

response to the prediction question and serves as

a

sort of confirmation for any hypothesis established by the prediction

question.

Statistical base-rates in previous research are often of

this population ratio type (Kahneman and Tversky,

Ajzen (1977) used

a

choosing to stratify
base-rates

#1

(1972)).

similar statistical base-rate about
a

a

However,

researcher

population such as was presented in statistical

and #2a, and also found lack of impact.

Why it is that

these results conflict with the Ajzen study finding of minimal impact of
non-causal base-rate is

a

question that requires further research.

may be that subjects did see

a

It

"causal" aspect to the statistical base-

rates; or it may be that because of the two non-causal base-rates which

were used had explicit content related to the hypothesis subjects might
have generated for confirmation.

Possibly confirmation

is

not based

upon whether or not information is causal, but whether it passes

cursory requirement of serving as

a

"because".

a

.

CHAPTER
STUDY

HI

II

Method

Subjects

.

The subjects were 80 undergraduate American
students of both sexes in
the "Year Abroad Program" at Hebrew University
of Jerusalem.

pation was entirely voluntary, as it was with Study

recruited from

a

I.

Partici-

Subjects were

variety of courses and assigned at random and in equal

numbers to the eight cells of the experimental design
(10 subjects per
cell)

Procedure

.

Each subject was instructed to read an introduction sheet (see Appendix
#1) which provided some information about the general

college age students.

health status of

They were given one of six prediction problems

which presented one base-rate, either causal or statistical and

a

history about

Two

a

coed named Deborah, i.e. indicant information.

case

additional conditions offered the base-rate only, with no case history.
Each subject answered only one question.

They were instructed to make

a

judgment about the likelihood of the person in question contracting

a

particular illness.

The question read, "What

is

the probability that

Deborah will develop an upper respiratory infection?"

The causal base-rate read, "Records from Israeli University Health
Services indicate that upper respiratory infections (common colds) are
25
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the most common illnesses among
all

college age students.

During the

1978-79 academic year, 70% of all female
students contracted an upper
respiratory infection at some time during
the year.
Only 30% of the

female students did not."
The statistical base-rate read, "A
nursing student at Hebrew Univ-

ersity did

a

study on the health behavior of students.

Because she was

primarily interested in how women react to
illness, she chose to interview mostly female students who had or were
suffering from upper respir-

atory infections (common colds).

As

a

result, 70% of her sample were

women suffering from upper respiratory infections
and only 30% of those
she interviewed were women who were not."
In

conditions

1,

2,

3,

6,

5,

7,

the base-rate was followed by the

indicant information, or case history of the coed, Deborah.
ferent cases were presented.

In the positive conditions

Three dif-

(conditions

1

and 5) the protagonist was portrayed as very active, under much pressure,

undernourished and generally prone to contracting upper respiratory
infection.

The positive condition read, "Deborah Cohen

University freshman who has an "undecided" major.
in history but wants

sequently, she

is

weight.

Hebrew

She is interested
Con-

carrying 18 credits for taking courses in several

a

activities and feels
commitments.

a

to be able to find a job after graduation.

departments in order to get
gling to maintain

is

a

feel

B+ average.
a

for what is offered.

She is strug-

Deborah is very involved with social

great deal of pull from both academic and social

She finds little time to eat well and is slightly under-

Deborah lives in the dorm and has two roommates."

The negative or non-confirming conditions (conditions

2

and 6)

"
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present

coed as being in very good health,
under mild pressure and

a

consequently unlikely to contract an upper
respiratory infection.
negative condition read, "Deborah Cohen
who has an "undecided" major.
be able to find

a

B+ average.

enjoys cooking her own meals.
help her stay in shape.

Hebrew University freshman

She is carrying 12 credits and

Deborah is

a

health food enthusiast and

She runs at least 4 kilometers

Deborah has

cription of the university coed.

day to

a

single room in the dorm."

a

The vague conditions (conditions

Cohen is

a

She is interested in history but
wants to

job after graduation.

a

easily maintains

is

The

3

and

7)

gave only

general

a

des-

The vague condition read, "Deborah

Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided" major.

a

She is interested in history but wants to be able to find

graduation.

She is carrying the usual

job after

a

12 credits and maintains

a

B+

average.

Pretesting was conducted in order to establish that the cases were
in fact sufficiently strong to permit subjects to distinguish among them

Forty-eight undergraduates, not participants in the study itself, were
asked to read one of the three case histories and make
to the

1 i

k

1 i

=

as

hood of Deborah contracting an upper respiratory infection.

There were 16 respondents for each history.
dition (X

judgment

a

The results for each con-

.55 -- confirming or positive condition,

X

=

X

=

demonstrated

F

(2,45) = 23.55, p.

significant difference

-- non-

.28 -- vague condition)

confirming or negative condition, and
a

.15

<

.05.

three were considered to be adequately divergent from one another.

The

The

finding from this pilot testing also provided the numerical weight for

computing the predicting outcomes for the study itself by using Bayes'

28

Rule.

The final two conditions presented
merely the base-rates with

no individuating information.

After reading the scenario, subjects
were asked to predict the
liklihood of Deborah developing an upper
respiratory infection.

Their

judgments were measured on the following
scale:

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Not at all

90%
(iL

100%
1

s;

j_

n

te,y

Participants were allowed as much time as they wanted
to complete
the question and in no case did the amount of
time exceed ten minutes.

After all questional" res were completed and returned,
anyone wishing to
discuss the study was invited to remain.

And as with Study 1,

a

number

of students at each administration session chose to remain
and partake
in

the discussion.

generate

a

The content of the stimulas materials seemed to

good deal of interest and several students hoped the discus-

sions could be

a

forum for seeking professional health advice.

Results

The results for Study

2

are presented in Table 2.

The "hypothesis

confirming" strategy that is suggested in this paper establishes differing predictions for each condition.

Condition

1

and 3 provide causal

base-rates that establish hypotheses which are "confirmed" by the positive
and vague case histories.

In these conditions it is predicted that

both items of information will be used by subjects to generate the

prediction.

Condition #2 also provides

a

causal base-rate but it is

followed by

nonconfi rming case history.

a

It is suggested that this

case history does not confirm the
hypothesis established by the baserate and consequently it is predicted
that the base-rate will be ignored

and only the case history used.
tical

base-rates.

Conditions

5,

6,

and

7

provide statis-

Because they in no way lend support to
the hypothesis

established by the prediction question, they
ought not to be used by
subjects for making their predictions.
a

Conditions

4

and 8 provide only

base-rate and in light of no additional information,
it

that subjects will

is

predicted

use the base-rates given.

Alternatively the predictions that are established by use
of Bayes
Rule suggest that for all conditions the causal or
statistical nature
of the base-rate is not relevant and the base-rates would
be used to
the same extent in combination with the numerical weight of
the individual

case-histories.

subject with

a

a

and

5

present the

positive case history that establishes Deborah

.55 chance of contracting the illness herself.

contracting the illness by
by N.

1

base-rate of 70% of all female students contract an

upper respiratory and
has a

For example, conditions

I

Denote females

and females not contracting the illness

Denote the likelihood of Deborah contracting the illness by

0 -

mZjl
p~[n7TT

.55
.45

P(I/i)

=

Tsfffss

"

PjlZIl

pUM
,70

v

.30

-

"

i.

P(I)

pW

385
135

74

If subjects use a Baysian approach, their predictions about the

1
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likelihood of Deborah contracting the
illness, both the base-rate and
case history, should be around
74%.
For conditions 2 and 6 this
percentage is 29% and for conditions

3

and

7

the percentage is 47%.

The most dramatic finding of the
study is the lack of any difference

between the causal base-rate and the
statistical base-rate impact on
the predictions.

same extent.

In all

conditions they were used to relatively
the

Additionally, subjects seemed to "systematically"
use

both the base-rate and case history in
making their predictions and

did not follow the results predicted
either by the theoretical model of
the paper or Bayes

'

Rule.

(See Table 2).

For conditions

and

1

5

(positive case history) the means of .64 and .68
hover very close to
62.5, the results one would obtain through simple averaging
of the two

results one would obtain through simple averaging of the
two pieces of
data provided.

Also, for conditions

2

and

6

(negative case history),

simple averaging would result in 42.5, close to the obtained means of
.48 and

.45.

.68 and

.67, startingly like those found in conditions

Conditions

3 and 7

(vague case history) produce results,
1

and

Results

5.

of .34 and .36 for conditions 4 and 8 (no case history) correspond to
the hypothesis that subjects use either causal or statistical base-rates

accurately when no additional information influences them.
presents the distribution responses for Study

relatively small amount of variance.

2

Figure #2

and highlights the

No significant statistical

dif-

ference exists between causal and statistical base-rate use or among
the results for the positive, negative or vague conditions
.09, ns
a

.

However, the mean results for the negative condition

bit lower than for the positive or vague conditions.

=

F( 5 ,54)

is

quite

The lack of
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statistical significance may be due to
the small number of subjects

tested in these cells.

Discussion

Several

issues raised by the results will be explored.

The first

of these is the finding that subjects used
the causal and statistical

base-rates to the same extent.

This is not consistent with either the

predictions of this study or findings of previous
studies which demonstrate that causal data have

a

greater impact in predictions than do

diagnostic data (Ajzen 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1977; Tversky and
Kahneman,
1977).

At first glace this suggests that the entire notion that
pre-

dictors use some form of hypothesis confirming strategy is erroneous.

However, it may be that the causal link which must be established in
this confirming process does not necessarily conform to an actual

causal

relationship but to

a

notion that people are able to "feel"

something happened "because" of

a

certain situation and consequently

see the data as lending support or confirmation to

a

notion or hypo-

thesis.

Tversky and Kahneman (1977) discuss the idea that data must
correspond to some preexisting causal schema and when they do, baserates are used.

They point out that an individual's causal schema

represents an association between

a

cause and an effect in which the

cause precedes the effect both logically and temporally; an individual's

existing causal schema is one that connects earlier manifestations

as

This outlines

a

cause of subsequent manifestations of the same system.

a

notion regarding causal itly as more complex than that implied by
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merely offering subjects

causal base-rate.

a

A single isolated item

of information cannot be viewed
as "causal" unless considered
in the
larger causal schema.
It may be just his conceptualization
that helps
sort through the discrepancy between
the hypothesis of the study
and
the findings.

Perhaps what is of importance isn't
so much whether the

base-rate is actually "causal" or not,
but whether it

is

seen as ex-

plicitly related to the content area
potentiating the prediction and

consequently available as
hypothesis generated.

a

piece of confirming information for
the

Cause may not be used by subjects in

that is logically satisfying but in

of causal schema.

a

a

fashion

way that corresponds to the notion

Antecontal data from students about why they used
or

didn't use particular base-rates suggests

a

similar process at work for

both causal and statistical base-rates.
"I

used the information about girls getting sick (causal base-

rate) because Deborah is a girl."
"I

had to use all of the information because Deborah was like

a

student in that nursing study so it was more probably she'd get sick."
(statistical base-rate).
Both of the base-rates related specifically to the content area
(girls getting sick) and are viable items for support of

a

causal schema

The subjects seem to hold an hypothesis and any particular information

which may help explain why the hypothesis is true.
In addition to the hypothesis concerning the use of causal

vs.

statistical base-rates, this paper put forth the contention that when

individuating information

is

contrary to the causal notions suggested

by the base-rate or not confirming of the hypothesis, the individuating
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information takes priority over the base-rate
and the base-rate

sentially ignored.

is

es-

However, it is clear that in all cases,
subjects

used both the individuating information and
the base-rates.

It may

have been erroneous to assume that the notion
of hypothesis confirming

strategies would cause the total
by

a

ignoring of

a

base-rate when followed

case history in conflict or not confirming of that
hypothesis.

In fact,

it now seems likely that if the subject supposes
that what is

to be predicted has happened (e.g.,

illness in Deborah), he/she searches

for the information that might confirm or disconfirm why that
may be,
such as considering the high incidence of illness in women and
Deborah's

personal state of health.

In the negative or non-confirming condition

Deborah's state of health is perceived as quite good and it is of course
a

crucial assessment in making the prediction.

sick quite often and

a

But "because" women get

large percentage of ill women were interviewed,

this must be taken into consideration.

If the prediction question

established an hypothesis (e.g., how likely

is

Deborah to develop an

upper respiratory infection? -- becomes -- Hypothesis: "Deborah will

contract an upper respiratory infection" the subject searches for
plausible reasons why that may be even though she

is

"healthy."

This

parallels Snyder's (1979) findings that people go to great lengths in

order to find

d?.ta

which confirm existing hypothesis.

In this case it

may not seem logical to say she's susceptible to developing an illness

because she's in the nursing student's study but it does suggest
"because" link.

It would be interesting to explore the results that

would be obtained if the question had asked "How likely
well?".

a

is

she to remain

Conditions 4 and 8 correspond to
the hypothesis that
subjects use
either causal or statistical
base-rates accurately when no
additional

information

is

provided, replicating

a

multitude of previous studies.

People are able and do use base-rate
when they have nothing else
upon
which to base their prediction.
In the vague conditions,

subjects not only used the base-rates
as

well as the individuating information,
but in some fashion increased

either the impact of the base-rate in
the prediction or increased the
perceived likelihood of Deborah's vulnerability
to contracting an
illness.

As discussed previously,

lihood at

X

=

.28, whereas

pretesting had established the like-

results for these conditions with the

statistical or causal base-rate and vague case
produced

X =

.67.

Regardless, the findings conform with those for the
positive condition
which was designed to confirm the hypothesis and
encourage one to make
a

—

prediction that illness was likely to occur (pilot data

X =

.55).

Because the findings for the vague conditions are so close to
the findings for the positive conditions, it seems reasonable to
suggest that
in some fashion the diagnosticity of vague indicant information
is

mediated by the causal base-rate provided; the likelihood ratio
therefore increased.

is

Perhaps because the case is vague, once an hypo-

thesis is established, subjects are allowed to use the given information
in

either direction as confirmation for the hypothesis.

As long as

the information does not directly invalidate the hypothesis, then con-

ceivably it "supports" it.

In this way the vague material

on weighted value and in this case

a

positive one.

may take

This too seems

consistent with the pervasive attempts by Snyder's subjects (1979) to
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seek confirmation for their
hypothesis using most un-useful
forms of
information.
(It would be interesting to
invert the statistical baserate using the same vague case
presentation in order to explore
whether
vague information is influenced in
both directions.)

Abelson (1974), Ajzen (1977) and Tversky
and Kahneman (1977) have

suggested that individuals carry with them
scripts or causal schemata
that they apply to predicting events and
occurrences in the world; that
this is so seems likely.

The notion of these scripts or schemata
con-

veys a sort of stable or consistent overtime
idea.

However, what may

Took stable or constant because it is well defined
and logically con-

sistent may in fact be much more transient and

a

product of the con-

tinuous process of people always being directed to attend
to particular

information based on hypotheses that they generate in specific points
in time.

CHAPTER

IV

GENERAL DISCUSSION

One basic contention of this paper
has been that the prediction

task may undergo redefinition by people
into one that establishes an

hypothesis that requires confirmation by
specific information.
suggested that implicitly this altered task

is

explaining wny something "is" or "happened" in
all

It was

one of attribution, or
a

certain way.

The over-

hypothesis made by the two studies contended that
base-rates would

be used if they were causal and additionally
even causal base-rates

would not be used if pertinent indicant information
was not confirming
of the hypothesis established by the base-rate.

However, the findings

of the two studies do not conform to these predictions.

A critical

analysis must be taken to explore what in fact may be producing
the

present results.
Initially, the "causal" nature of a base-rate must be considered.
As was pointed out previously,

what

is

causal

intuition.

(Ajzen, 1977) the distinction between

and what isn't has been based largely upon researcher

From the informal discussion with subjects, it seems that

people tend to use information as

a

not it actually possess

cause and effect relationship.

parallel

a

logical

"cause" or "because" whether or
The

finding between statistical and causal base-rates in all but

one condition of both studies tends to confirm that indeed subjects

regarded both types of base-rates as similarly relevant to them in
their predictions.

Consideration of the one condition in which subjects

failed to use the statistical base-rate to the same extent
36

as

the
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causal may be helpful

in

explaining the dynamic at work.

dition (study l, condition

2)

In that con-

the statistical base-rate
presents

mere

a

population ratio regarding the number of
male and female students and
it is

in no way specifically related to
the content of the prediction

question.

As such,

it offers no information with which
to confirm

the hypothesis that might be established
from the prediction question

which is asked.
In Study

subjects were asked the probability that

1

a

person,

selected at random from those with upper respiratory
infections lasting
in excess of -two weeks was

a

male student.

The two relevant items of

content are males developing the illness and the duration of
the illness
for males, not the proportion of males and females.

Subjects may con-

sider the question to establish an hypothesis with clear dimensions of

what one ought to consider in order to confirm its truth, and then
attend to only those base-rates with that content.
In Study 2 the subjects were asked the probability that a particular

student, Deborah would develop an upper respiratory infection.

The

hypothesis that might be generated would direct the subject to consider
that information that would confirm illness occurring in Deborah; in

other words, both the indicant information and base-rates on incidence
of the illness.

Contrary to the present findings, Ajzen (1977)
base-rates had

a

found that causal

stronger effect on predictions than non-causal.

How-

ever, his findings also indicated a significant effect for conditions
that were presented "75% passed" as opposed to "75% failed."

The

question used to measure responses was "the probability that Gary

U.

i
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was among the students who passed the
exam is

—

n

light of the

present discussion the content of the
question would recommend to subjects
that they attend to information about Gary
and passing the exam, not

necessarily failing the exam.
in use of statistical

Perhaps this accounts for the variation

and causal base-rates and may be
consistent with

the present analysis.

The findings of these studies are not those
that were initially
predicted.

The discussion attempts to resolve the apparent
conflict

and offers an explanation for the results.

The notion that the prediction

question tells the subject what is relevant information
to consider
must, of course, be emperically tested.

Snyder (1979) has pointed out

that people tend to seek to confirm hypotheses as if those
hypotheses

were

a

reality. And Ajzen, Dal to and Blyth (1978) have pointed out

that one's cognitive set may produce

a

tendency to interpret ambiguous

information as consistent with the hypothesis in question.

It follows

that people might consider the prediction question (i.e. hypothesis)
as

real

and use related ambiguous information as confirming.

It is unfortunate that non-significance is rarely reported in

journals because it may be that other researchers have also had dif-

ficulty duplicating the lack of difference between causal and statistical base-rates.

Recent studies under the direction of Pollatsek

(1980) have had a similar experience in failing to replicate the causal/

non-causal difference.

Contrary to conclusions from previous prediction studies, the
findings of the present research indicate that when two base-rates are
used, subjects'

predictions conform quite well to

a

Baysian analysis
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and are consistant with the tradition that
people form and revise beliefs
in an orderly and rational

fashion in accordance with normative
principles

of statistical models (see Slovic and
Lichtenstein, 1971).

However, such

outcomes shed little light on the actual process
one uses when predicting;
how does the subject choose what information to
use, and what form of

expression does he use to combine that information?

Reliance on paper

and pencil questionaires limits the understanding of
the process and

encourages conclusions drawn from results.

It would be the essential

next step for the theoretical process presented in this paper
to be

explored through in-depth interviews and discussion with subjects about
their conscious rationale for decisions.

Pollatsek (1980) has been doing

studies in this fashion and has thus far found it

a

useful

tool

for

understanding the subjects' thinking process.
Central to all of the issues raised by the present studies is the

question of what is or is not "causal."

A series of studies designed

in a fashion that offered information to subjects

in a range of content

areas and asks them to make particular predictions and to explain why

would be

a

first essential step.

Wedded to this could be the attribution

task, that is, to provide subjects with an hypothesis and ask them to

determine what factors influenced its occurrance and why.
this fashion both the problem of the causal

well

as

its relationship to the proposal

of the prediction task

is

It seems

in

link could be explored as

made by this paper, that part

hypothesis confirmation and somewhat attrib-

utional in nature.
A second area of study ought to center upon varying the specific

content areas in the prediction question in order to see if use of
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particular base-rates can be manipulated
by the content of the question
The third area might explore
similarities between treating a
hypothesis as

a

reality and seeking confirmation and
the manner in

which subjects use base-rates.
research raises

a

It appears that the present
limited

number of questions more than it answers.

Table

1

The Mean Probabilities of Male
Being Chosen at Random, Compared
to the Predicted Means and Means
Produced
by Use of Bayes' Rule

Type of

base-rate

a

Mean
Probabil i ties
(Results)

Thesis
Predictions

Predictions

.57

.56

.56

.32

.30

56

.49

75

56

.58

.56

.56

"Bayes

Incidence of
colds by sex
(1)

Duration of
colds by sex

Incidence of
colds by sex
(2)

Sex distributions
at Hebrew University

Designed incidence
by sex
(3)

Duration of cold
by sex

Designed incidence
by sex
(4)

Designed duration
by sex

Note
a

,

n

=

10 per cell;

F

(3,

36)

=

9.72,

p

>

.05

Numbers in parentheses indicate the "condition number."
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1

"

)

)

Table

2

Mean Probabilities of Deborah Contracting
an Illness Under Different
txperimental Conditions Compared to the
Predicted Means
and Means Produced by Use of Bayes
Rule
'

Type of
base-rate

'

Positive

Results

Incidence of/,%
[l)
colds in

'YPe of Indicant Information

Negative

Thesis
Predicted

.64

.74

.58

.55

Results

(2)

T

Vague

S

S

^
Predicted
I

0

J

Results
^suiis

.48

.15

(3)

.45

.15

(7)

Thesis
Predicted

68

47

.67

.28

femal es
(causal

Designed

(c

.

incidence^

loj

of colds
in females
(statistical
*.74

Note
a

,

n

=

*.29

*.47

10 per cell

Numbers in parentheses indicate the "condition number."
Denotes results one would obtain through use of Bayes' Rule
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K

Figure Captions

Figure 1:
Distribution of responses for subier^' n
two base-rates.
In this graph! the niler s
n
re
the condition; Md stands for Median;
X stands for Mean
presented subjects runs from 0% to 100%.

^r+^„,

Z

^iSnttfC

9

The ranqe
ge

Figure 2:
Distribution of responses for subjects'
predictions usina
one base-rate and indicant information.
In this graph! the
umbers
S ld6ntify the condi ^"ons; Md
P renthe
stands for Median! X stands
in.
M
r!
for Mean.
The range presented subjects runs from
0% to 100%
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Figure

1

0

50

Figure

%
2

Md

100
(7)
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APPENDIX

1

University students are at risk for
problems.

a

range of particular health

The typical age span of 18 to 24
years predisposes students

to contract certain illnesses and
the nature of group living inherent

in campus life enhances the spread of
contagious disease.

Information

concerning the health behavior of students
suggests that they are often
either unaware of these problems or have
difficulty using information
to prevent or treat an illness once
contracted.

this group are mild and relatively self-limiting.

Usually illnesses for
However,

a

large

number of students, because of risk factors such
as general health
status, diet, and stress and the like become quite ill
and require

hospitalization.

Some may even develop chronic, long-term conditions.

Prevention and early diagnosis would decrease the number of individuals

whose illnesses become severe enough to require hospitalization.
Students themselves are in the strongest position to prevent these
diseases through early self diagnosis.

It is important to be able to

combine one's knowledge of an illness with predisposing factors and

existing patterns in order to make

a

judgment about ways to avoid or

restrict the severity of an illness.
In order to assess students'

ability to take into account factors

affecting contracting and treating an illness, you will be presented
with information describing the prevalence of an illness and/or an
individual case history of
will be asked to make

particular illness.

a

a

You

university student chosen at random.

probability judgment about occurrence of

a

After you have completed the questional
re

,

you will be given

information pertinent to understanding
this process of diagnostic
prediction.
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APPENDIX

STUDY

2

I

Condition

1

~

Records from Israeli University Health
Services indicate that U,mnpr
feCt1 ° n (C ° mm0n C ° 1dS)
P
y
the Ssl
es
™nn
i?
396 S tUd ntS
~ 79
Uring
the
1978
academic year
,°
7$of
pf were ,female
?
70/, of I
alll rl
cases
students and 30% were male students.

m

^r

'

The percentage of upper respiratory
infections that last in excess of
15
t1meS hi9h6r am0nQ malS StudentS than
among finale
students

What is the probability that a student,
selected at random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in
excess of two weeks, was
a male student?

IM
Hot
1

likely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Absolutely
likely
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STUDY

I

Condition

2

Records from Israeli University Health
Services indicate that uonor
r
feCti ° nS
C
n C ° lds) are the most
common
ne
es
among
amonolall! college age students. During
the 1978-79 academic year 70"
of all cases were of female students
and 30% were male students

r°

Ll

studeStT

UniVerSlty there are three times more

^

students than female

What is the probability that a student at
Hebrew University, selected
at random from those with upper respiratory
infections, was a male
s

uiiuent i

M
^
,
?J,
likely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Absolutely
likely
J
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STUDY

I

Condition

3

Nationwide the percentage of upper respiratory
infections that last in
excess of two weeks is three times higher among
male students than
among female students.
What is the probability that a student selected at
random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in excess of two
weeks was
a male student?

0%

10%

Not
at all
1

ikely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Absol utely
likely
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STUDY

I

Condition 4

T

LZVof

reW U

"i™™*y «d

a study on

the health be-

^

y f
UPPer reSP,rat0ry mfec t1o
°
'co^^^ds
As a result, 70/o of
as
o? h:,her sample were women and only 30%
of those she
interviewed were male students suffering
from upper respiratory Infections
fe

r"sun

As

^

9

r

™

,

it turned out, she was also interested
in how the length of an

illness effects males and females differently.
Consequently she chose
her subjects such that three times more
male students than female
respiratory infect ions that lasted in excess
of
two weeks

What is the probability that a student selected
at random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in
excess of two weeks, was
a male student?

9%

10%

Not
at all
1

ikely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

1

00%

Absol utely
1 ikely
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STUDY

II

Condition

—

1

Records from Israeli University
Health Services indict*
a+
feCti ° nS {
C ° lds)
nes^I
i?
among all college
age students.
During the 1978-79 academ r Tell
of all female students contracted
an upper respirftorv infection
some time during the year.
Only 30% of'the feSalf sS<tenS
5?d not.

EE^l?"

m

^

™n

w
V

Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University
freshman who has an "undecided"
SHe
lnterested
°
history but wants to be able to find
a
i,
7rl
"I
job after
graduation.
Consequently, she is carrying 18 credits
and

^

rSe

n

V ral

in

°^er

fc^hat
offered.
o?fere°d
Shp
t
She if
is struggling
to maintain a B+ average.
Deborah is
very involved with social activities and
feels a great deal o? pul
a "demic and social commitments.
She finds little time to
pTu,«n
eat well and is slightly underweight.
Deborah lives in the dorm and
has two roommates.
is

to ge't a

feeT

What is the probability that Deborah will
develop an upper respiratory
J
infection?

%
N° t

10%

„

at all
1

ikely

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Absolutely
likely
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STUDY

II

Condition

2

Records from the Israeli University
Health Services inW-i^+ Q
eS

oll

*

^e

age students.

^

*

During

the 1978-79 academic
I°
year 70/o
7
of all J
female students contracted an
upper resDiratnrv
infection at some time during the
year.
Only aoSIf t'hTf

^students

e

Heb re

Uni versit

Ashman

who has an "undecided"
y
maior^ s£ ?Ji I
+
!!
u
tGd
in hlSt
but
Wants to be ab1e to find a job
°7
atter graduation.
after'ara^t
on
%T
She is carrying 12 credits and easily
maintains a P,+
average

Deborah is a health food enthusiast and
enjoys cooking her
own meals
She runs at least 4 kilometers a day
t
her stay
7
shape.
Deborah has a single room in the dorm.

Z

6

infection?

0*

10%

Not
at all

likely

probabi1ity that Deborah wil1 develop an upper
respiratory

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Absolutely
likely
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STUDY II

Condition

tin* during the year.

son,e

ah

6

^

ma ior

Zl

ShMnJ.!*?!!
interested

probab1111

inreciionT

U?*„

20%

»

30%

oTtte^M^S'Sd''^.

Un1
rsU >'
who has an "undecided"
in hmory but wants to be
able to find a
Carry1nS the USUal 12 c-dUs and
Itntains

^"

!

iVllZZ

—M

Only 30.

3

"«h-n

^

that Deborah wi

40%

50%

"

60%

d«elop

707,

an upper respiratory

80%

90%

TOM

Absolutely

60

STUDY

II

Condition 4
Records from the Israeli University
Health Service indict* *h a+
feCti ° nS

(C

C01 ^ S)

^

Ss?
1
seT"
among all college age students.
During the 1978-79 academ c
vear 70?
of all cases were of female
students and 30% were ma?e students

a™ra^i?

r°

n

the

What is the probability that a
student, selected at random from
those
with upper respiratory infections,
was a male student?

—

2*
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Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman
who has an "undecided"
major
She is interested in history but wants to be
able to find a
job after graduation.
Consequently, she is carrying 18 credits and
taking courses in several departments in order
to get a feel for what
is offered.
She is struggling to maintain a B+ average.
Deborah is
very involved with social activities and feels
a great deal of pull
from both academic and social commitments.
She finds little time to
eat well and is slightly underweight.
Deborah lives in the dorm and
has two roommates.

What is the probability that Deborah will develop an upper
respiratory
infection?
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Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman
who has an "undecided"
major
She is interested in history but wants
to be able to find a
job after graduation.
She is carrying 12 credits and easily
maintains
a B+ average.
Deborah is a health food enthusiast and
enjoys cooking
her own meals.
She runs at least 4 kilometers a day to
help her stay
in shape.
Deborah has a single room in the dorm.
What is the probability that Deborah will develop
an upper respiratory
infection?
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Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University
freshman who has an "undecided"
major.
She is interested in history but wants to
be able to find a job
after graduation.
She is carrying the usual 12 credits and
maintain
a d+ average.
6 pr ° bability that Deborah w
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